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Abstract Recently, many psychological effects have been
surprisingly difficult to reproduce. This article asks why,
and investigates whether conceptually replicating an effect
in the original publication is related to the success of inde-
pendent, direct replications. Two prominent accounts of
low reproducibility make different predictions in this re-
spect. One account suggests that psychological phenomena
are dependent on unknown contexts that are not reproduced
in independent replication attempts. By this account, internal
replications indicate that a finding is more robust and, thus,
that it is easier to independently replicate it. An alternative
account suggests that researchers employ questionable re-
search practices (QRPs), which increase false positive rates.
By this account, the success of internal replications may just
be the result of QRPs and, thus, internal replications are not
predictive of independent replication success. The data of a
large reproducibility project support the QRP account: repli-
cating an effect in the original publication is not related to
independent replication success. Additional analyses reveal
that internally replicated and internally unreplicated effects
are not very different in terms of variables associated with
replication success. Moreover, social psychological effects in
particular appear to lack any benefit from internal replications.
Overall, these results indicate that, in this dataset at least, the
influence of QRPs is at the heart of failures to replicate psy-
chological findings, especially in social psychology. Variable,
unknown contexts appear to play only a relatively minor role.
I recommend practical solutions for how QRPs can be
avoided.
Keywords Replication . Reproducibility . QRP .
False positives . Publication bias
Introduction
The hallmark of scientific evidence is its reproducibility.
Recently, the Open Science Collaboration (2015) found that
psychological science is less reproducible than desired. This
reproducibility project tried to independently replicate 100
effects, of which 97were statistically significant in the original
publications. Even though an estimated average power of
92 % for replication experiments would predict 89 successful
replications, only 35 were observed. Moreover, 82 out of 99
studies for which effect sizes could be calculated showed
smaller replication effect sizes than original estimates. This
paper asks a simple question: are internal replications, i.e.
showing an effect more than once in a given publication, pre-
dictive of independent replication success? The answer to this
question can contribute to our understanding of why many
independent replications were unsuccessful, and what can be
done in order to avoid low replication rates in the future.
According to the unknown moderator account of indepen-
dent replication failure, successful internal replications should
correlate with independent replication success. This account
suggests that replication failure is due to the fact that psycho-
logical phenomena are highly context-dependent, and
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replicating seemingly irrelevant contexts (i.e. unknown mod-
erators) is rare (e.g., Barrett, 2015; DGPS, 2015; Fleming
Crim, 2015; see also Stroebe & Strack, 2014; for a critique,
see Simons, 2014). For example, some psychological phe-
nomenon may unknowingly be dependent on time of day.
Data acquisition in the morning reveals it while in the after-
noon the effect is absent. The unknown moderator account
predicts that successful internal replications (which were over-
whelmingly conceptual replications) increase independent
(direct) replication success because an internally replicated
phenomenon is less likely to be a chance finding, and more
likely to be found despite small variations in experimental
design, compared to a phenomenon without internal
replication.
The latter point rests on the distinction between conceptual
and direct replications, represented here by internal and inde-
pendent replications, respectively. Conceptual replications test
the same theory with variable experimental designs. Internal
replications were overwhelmingly of this type. In contrast,
direct replications attempt to recreate an experimental design
as closely as possible. Independent replications were of this
type because replication teams consulted with original authors
and used original materials in order to minimize procedural
differences between original and independent replication stud-
ies (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). Therefore, procedur-
al differences between studies, which the unknown moderator
account invokes in order to explain replication failures, were
intended for internal, conceptual replications. Thus, if a phe-
nomenon can be reproduced with intentionally more proce-
dural differences (internal, conceptual replications) it should
be possible to reproduce it also with fewer procedural differ-
ences (independent, direct replications).
Of course, for a single pair of original and replication stud-
ies, the kind of procedural differences is important rather than
their number. However, for a collection of original-replication
pairs, the greater the number of procedural differences be-
tween original and replication studies, the greater the chances
that some differences of importance (e.g. crucial replication
contexts) are among them. This chance is greater for internal,
conceptual replications than for independent, direct replica-
tions. Hence, according to the unknown moderator account,
the existence of successful internal replications predicts that a
psychological phenomenon is more robust against small var-
iations in experimental design and, hence, that independent
replications will be successful.
A second account of independent replication failure pre-
dicts no independent replication difference between effects
with or without internal replications. This account attri-
butes low independent replication success to the fact that
questionable research practices (QRPs) employed in origi-
nal studies were not applied during replication attempts.
Examples of QRPs are (for a longer list, see Asendorpf
et al., 2013):
(1) Optional stopping (‘sampling until significant’)
A researcher repeatedly tests the data during acquisi-
tion and stops sampling once the P-value is below .05.
This is not an uncommon practice as revealed by the
5 %–23 % of surveyed psychological researchers admit-
ting to having stopped sampling early, and 32 %–58 %
admitting to having stopped late based on the results
(Fiedler & Schwarz, 2015; John, Loewenstein, &
Prelec, 2012). In practice, this QRP can increase the false
positive rate to 22 %–29 % (Simmons, Nelson, &
Simonsohn, 2011; data simulations in Supplementary
materials), while in theory even 100 % false positives
are possible (Wagenmakers, 2007).
(2) Publication bias (the ‘file drawer’ problem; Rosenthal,
1979)
Researchers are reluctant to write up non-significant
results, as revealed by the fate of preregistered studies in
the social sciences in general (Franco, Malhotra, &
Simonovits, 2014), and in psychology in particular
(Franco, Malhotra, & Simonovits, 2016). Survey results
are in line with these findings: 42 %–50 % of psycholog-
ical researchers admit to at least once having only report-
ed studies that “worked” (Fiedler & Schwarz, 2015; John
et al., 2012). Moreover, it is commonly believed that
scientific journals are reluctant to publish non-
significant results. Both kinds of bias result in publica-
tion bias, the tendency is for significant results to be
published while non-significant results remain unpub-
lished (see also LeBel et al., 2013).
(3) HARKing (hypothesizing after a result is known; Kerr,
1998)
All effects are reported as supporting the hypotheses.
If an effect happens to be in an unexpected direction, the
hypothesis is adjusted post hoc to make it seem as if the
direction of the effect was expected after all, i.e. effect
sizes are never negative (de Groot, 1956/2014). A com-
mon practice that 35 %–45 % of surveyed psychological
researchers admit to (Fiedler & Schwarz, 2015; John
et al., 2012).
Data simulations have repeatedly shown that QRPs reduce
research effort, e.g., in terms of lowering the sample size per
study, while increasing the false positive rate and exaggerating
the estimated effect size (Bakker, Dijk, & Wicherts, 2012;
Guan & Vandekerckhove, 2015; Simmons et al., 2011; see
also data simulations in Supplementary materials).
Therefore, if a researcher wants to claim that a new finding
is replicable, s/he can simply run several studies, employing
QRPs in each case and risking more than one false-positive
finding. As a result, the QRP account predicts that internal
replications, i.e. showing an effect more than once in the same
publication, are not predictive of independent replication suc-
cess (for a different approach which also uses the existence of
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internal replications for arguing that QRPs were used, see
Francis, 2014; Francis, Tanzman, & Matthews, 2014;
Schimmack, 2012).
Overall, the difference between the two explanations lies in
the fact that, under the unknownmoderator account, original and
replication studies tap into slightly different true effects (indepen-
dent of research practices) while the QRP account attributes low
replication rates to the practices themselves. Thus, did the Open
Science Collaboration (2015) successfully reproduce internally
replicated effects more often than internally unreplicated effects
(prediction by unknown moderator account) or not (prediction
by QRP account)? Here, I will re-analyze the data acquired by
the Open Science Collaboration (2015) in order to address this
question by examining predictions from both explanations for
the low independent replication success.
1. Contrasting reproducibility between internally
replicated effects and internally unreplicated effects
Methods
Data set
The reproducibility project’s dataset of 100 independent rep-
lication studies was used (for details, see Open Science
Collaboration, 2015). Of the original effects, 44 were internal-
ly, conceptually replicated, 20 once, 10 twice, 9 three times,
and 5 more than three times. Here, I simply contrast the re-
producibility of internally replicated and internally
unreplicated effects, see Fig. 1.1
Analysis
R-code for re-creating all figures and analyses is provided in
the Supplementary materials. In a first analysis I calculated the
Bayes factor, which represents the relative evidence for one
model over another: the null model of no difference between
internally replicated and not internally replicated effects (QRP
account), and the alternative model of greater replication suc-
cess for internally replicated compared to not internally repli-
cated effects (unknown moderator account). I used Morey,
Rouder, & Jamil's (2015) BayesFactor package in R in order
to compare proportions (contingency table Bayes factor test;
Gunel & Dickey, 1974) and scores (Bayesian independent t-
test; Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, & Iverson, 2009). The
latter analysis assumes a normal distribution. In case normal-
ity was not met and could not be reached through data trans-
formations, the Bayes factor is reported only for completion.
I follow common practice for characterizing relative model
support based on Bayes factors: BF0+ > 1 indicates support for
the null hypothesis (QRP account), BF+0 > 1 indicates support
for the alternative model (unknown moderator account).
Jeffreys (1961) suggests that 1 < BF < 3 provides model ev-
idence that is not worth more than a bare mention; 3 < BF < 10
indicates that the evidence for a hypothesis is substantial,
when 10 < BF < 30 it is strong.
A second Bayesian analysis was performed using parame-
ter estimation based on 100,000 samples from the posterior
distribution (log odds ratio for contingency table, difference
score for t-test). The estimated parameters are a formal repre-
sentation of the belief in the difference between internally
replicated and internally unreplicated effects. The 95 %
Credible Interval is a measure of uncertainty about this belief.
Please note that Bayesian estimation of difference scores used
Krushke’s BEST package (Kruschke, 2013; Meredith &
Kruschke, 2015), which does not assume normality.
Therefore, data were not transformed and the estimated pa-
rameters are straightforward to interpret.
Results
Figure 1 shows that there is no independent replication advan-
tage for original studies that internally replicated an effect
compared to those that did not, see Table 1 for formal analy-
ses. The left panel of Fig. 1 does not indicate any support for
the unknown moderator account that predicts lower indepen-
dent replication P-values for internally replicated compared to
internally unreplicated effects. The mean (white dot), median
(middle dark grey line), and inter-quartile range (upper and
lower dark grey lines) all show a difference in the unpredicted
direction (Pinternally unreplicated < Pinternally replicated).
I use P < .05 as a measure of independent replication suc-
cess (Fig. 1 left panel, dotted line) and compare replication
success proportions using the Bayes factor and parameter es-
timation. The contingency table Bayes factor of BF0+ = 8.72
indicates substantial support for the null hypothesis of no dif-
ference (representing the QRP account) over the alternative
hypothesis of a greater proportion of P < .05 for internally
replicated effects (29 % replication success) compared to in-
ternally unreplicated effects (41 % replication success).
Moreover, the posterior median of the log odds is negative
at −0.52, counterintuitively implying that the presence of in-
ternal replications reduces the chances of independent repli-
cation success. However, the uncertainty about this reversed
replication advantage is noteworthy [95 % Credible Interval
(−1.39; 0.31)]. Overall, the comparison of independent repli-
cation P-values supports the QRP account that predicts no
1 Data for P-value comparison: study pairs with statistically significant
original effects and exact replication P-values (N = 96, 44 % internally
replicated). Data for effect size reduction comparison: studies whose ef-
fect sizes could be calculated (N = 97, 42 % internally replicated).
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difference between internally replicated and internally
unreplicated effects.
If the reduction in effect size between original and replica-
tion study is used as the criterion for replication success, the
conclusion is the same. Looking at the right panel of Fig. 1
does not indicate any support for the unknown moderator
account, which predicts an effect size reduction closer to zero
for internally replicated effects (observed M = .20, SD = .20)
compared to internally unreplicated effects (observedM = .20,
SD = .22). Again the median and the interquartile range are in
the opposite direction (r_differenceinternally unreplicated closer to
zero than r_differenceinternally replicated) of what the unknown
moderator account predicts.
Given that the normality assumption is not met, I only
discuss parameter estimation results, see Table 1. The posteri-
or median of the difference between effect size reductions of
previously internally replicated and previously internally
unreplicated effects is zero. The 95 % Credible Interval is
narrow, never even extending to a difference of anything else
than trivial (trivial effects have values of |r| < .1; Cohen, 1992).
The picture is very similar when following the practice of the
Open Science Collaboration (2015) in using Fisher trans-
formed effect sizes (Cohen’s q) for the same comparison (triv-
ial differences have |q| < .1, Cohen, 1992). The formal analysis
supports the aforementioned visual impression: the difference
between original and replication effect sizes is practically the
same whether an effect was internally replicated or not, as
predicted by the QRP account.
Discussion
Internal conceptual replications do not improve independent
replication outcomes, as predicted by the QRP account. This
finding is in line with an unrelated, recent Bayesian re-
analysis of the reproducibility project’s dataset (Etz &
Vandekerckhove, 2016). However, proponents of the un-
known moderator account could argue that the presence of
internal replications is just one of many factors predicting
reproducibility. Do other reproducibility predictors counteract
the influence of internal replications on independent
reproducibility?
2. Contrasting reproducibility predictors
between internally replicated and internally
unreplicated effects
Methods
Data set
I use the same data set as above.
Analysis
The Open Science Collaboration (2015) identified seven
reproducibility predictors: field of study, effect type (main
or interaction), original study P-value, original study effect
size, replication power, surprisingness of the original ef-
fect, challenge of conducting the replication. I also include
the presence of a formal power analysis and original sam-
ple size in this comparison based on the suggestion of a
reviewer.
The formal analysis is along the lines seen above. The
QRP account again predicts no difference between internally
replicated and internally unreplicated effects in terms of
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Fig. 1 Comparing the reproducibility of internally replicated and
unreplicated effects in an empirical dataset. Left panel P-values
obtained by independent replication teams. The dotted line represents
the threshold for considering an effect statistically significant (P = .05).
Note that the bottom 25% quartile in the right distribution of the left panel
relating to previously internally unreplicated effects is at P = .0017 and,
thus, not visible here. Right panel Reduction in effect size between
original study and independent replication. Violin plots display density,
i.e. thicker parts represent more data points
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reproducibility predictors (null hypothesis). The unknown
moderator account predicts that factors favoring reproducibil-
ity are more common in internally unreplicated effects com-
pared to internally replicated effects. This would explain why,
under this account, the presence of internal replications—
looked at in isolation—is not predictive of independent repli-
cation success.
Results
In general, original studies with and without internal replica-
tions were very similar with respect to factors predicting re-
producibility, see Table 1 (BF0+ > 3, posterior centred near
zero). For some predictors, the evidence was inconclusive,
see Table 1 (BF0+ < 3, BF+0 < 3, posterior not centred near
zero but 95 % Credible Interval includes zero). There is one
exception to this general pattern: the field of study (BF+0 =
5.76). Effects that were internally replicated were more likely
to be classified as social psychological effects (69 %), while
effects which were not internally replicated were mostly
(54 %) cognitive effects. In other words, internal replications
cannot fully remove the influence of the field of study (social
psychological effects are difficult to replicate) on independent
replication success.
This unexpected result raises the obvious question of
whether the unknown moderator account is well supported
in at least one field of study. However, this is not the case,
Table 1 Comparison of internally replicated and internally unreplicated effects
Internal replication
present
Internal replication
absent
Bayes factor Posterior median
[95 % Credible Interval]a
Reproducibility
Independent replications P < .05 12 out of 42 22 out of 54 BF0+ = 8.72 −0.52
[−1.39; 0.31]
Effect size reduction (simple subtraction)b M = 0.20 M = 0.20 BF0+ = 4.15 −0.00
(SD = 0.20) (SD = 0.22) [−0.09; 0.08]
Effect size reduction (Cohen’s q)b M = 0.20 M = 0.24 BF0+ = 2.43 0.00
(SD = 0.26) (SD = 0.27) [−0.10; 0.10]
Reproducibility predictors
Field of study 13 × cognitive 29 × cognitive BF+0 = 5.76 0.22
29 × social 25 × social [0.03; 0.40]
Effect type 20 × main effect 29 × main effect BF0+ = 3.13 0.02
16 × interaction 21 × interaction [−0.18; 0.23]
Original study P-valueb M = .015 M = .013 BF0+ = 2.78 0.00
(SD = .016) (SD = .016) [−0.00; 0.01]
Original effect size M = .36 M = .42 BF+0 = 1.42 0.07
(SD = .15) (SD = .22) [−0.01; 0.14]
Independent replication powerb M = .92 M = .92 BF0+ = 3.64 0.01
(SD = .08) (SD = .09) [−0.02; 0.04]
Surprisingness of original effectc M = 3.19 M = 2.97 BF0+ = 1.36 0.21
(SD = 0.98) (SD = 0.83) [−0.17; 0.60]
Challenge of conducting replicationb,d M = −.06 M = −.05 BF0+ = 4.74 −0.03
(SD = 0.79) (SD = 0.82) [−0.36; 0.31]
Formal power analysis in original
publication present/absent
0 × present 2 × present BF0+ = 22.21 −0.03
42 × absent 52 × absent [−0.11; 0.04]
Sample size of original studye M = 71.00 M = 92.44 BF0+ = 4.41 −6.25
(SD = 55.77) (SD = 124.12) [−25.94; 14.50]
a Positive values represent support for the alternative hypothesis representing the unknown moderator account
b Data not normally distributed. No satisfactory data transformation could be found. The reader should therefore focus on parameter estimation which
does not assume normality
c Based on mean of three raters using Likert scale from 1 (not at all surprising) to 6 (extremely surprising)
d Based on combination of three standardized mean ratings as in Open Science Collaboration (2015)
e Natural logarithm of raw data due to non-normal distribution of raw values. Raw data results in BF0+ = 1.74. Analysis excludes one study with an
unusual sample size (N = 230,025)
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see Table 2. The Bayes factors either support the null hypoth-
esis (social psychology), or they are inconclusive (cognitive
psychology). Parameter estimation of the difference in effect
size reductions between internally replicated and internally
unreplicated effects leads to a similar conclusion. In social
psychology, the effect size reduction difference’s 95 %
Credible Interval ranges from a small negative difference
(the opposite to the unknown moderator account’s predic-
tion) to a trivial positive difference (for both simple reduc-
tion and Cohen’s q). In cognitive psychology, on the other
hand, the 95 % Credible Interval is nearly twice as big,
ranging from small negative differences to small positive
differences, i.e. the data do not support either hypothesis
strongly.
Discussion
Are factors favouring reproducibility more common in inter-
nally unreplicated effects compared to internally replicated
effects, as predicted by the unknown moderator account?
There is not much evidence for this proposal. While it is
true that there is a difference between internally replicated
and internally unreplicated effects in terms of field of study,
neither field convincingly displays an independent replica-
tion advantage for internally replicated effects. Whether in-
ternally replicated and unreplicated effects differ on un-
known variables predicting replication success is unclear,
given that this analysis uses correlational data. Overall, in
line with analysis 1, analysis 2 found support for the QRP
account.
General discussion
Why were many psychological effects not reproduced by the
Open Science Collaboration (2015)? One account suggests
that replication teams tapped into smaller, or even null, popu-
lation effects because they did not re-create important exper-
imental contexts (unknown moderator account). This account
predicts that internal replications increase independent repli-
cation success. Another account suggests that original re-
searchers used QRPs, which exaggerated their results, while
the replication teams did not use them (QRP account). By this
account, internal replications should not correlate with inde-
pendent replication success. Given that internal replications
are not predictive of independent replication success, the
QRP account appears to be the better explanation, see Table
1. Moreover, the lack of predictive value of internal replica-
tions is not simply due to other reproducibility predictors
counter-acting the influence of internal replications on inde-
pendent replication success, see Section 2.
Still, a proponent of the unknownmoderator account might
argue that, as soon as the data analysis context changes, re-
producibility cannot be achieved. For example, whether inter-
nally, conceptually replicating an effect in the morning or not,
a direct, independent replication attempt in the afternoon will
not show some phenomenon that is dependent on time of day.
However, this argument misses two points. First, the influence
Table 2 Comparison of internally replicated and internally unreplicated effects for different fields of study
Internal replication present Internal replication absent Bayes factor Posterior median
[95 % Credible Interval]a
Social psychology
Independent replications P < .05 5 out of 29 8 out of 25 BF0+ = 7.60 −0.76
[−2.03; 0.45]
Effect size reduction (simple subtraction)b M = 0.22 M = 0.17 BF0+ = 7.15 −0.06
(SD = 0.16) (SD = 0.17) [−0.15; 0.04]
Effect size reduction (Cohen’s q)b M = 0.23 M = 0.17 BF0+ = 6.96 −0.06
(SD = 0.18) (SD = 0.19) [−0.17; 0.04]
Cognitive psychology
Independent replications P < .05 7 out of 13 14 out of 29 BF0+ = 1.92 0.21
[−1.05; 1.49]
Effect size reduction (simple subtraction)b M = 0.15 M = 0.24 BF0+ = 1.26 0.08
(SD = 0.26) (SD = 0.25) [−0.10; 0.26]
Effect size reduction (Cohen’s q)b M = 0.13 M = 0.29 BF+0 = 1.38 0.13
(SD = 0.36) (SD = 0.32) [−0.11; 0.38]
a Positive values represent support for the alternative hypothesis representing the unknown moderator account
b Data not normally distributed. No satisfactory data transformation could be found. The reader should therefore focus on parameter estimation which
does not assume normality
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of unknown moderators is not predictable, i.e. it is a process
governed by random chance. When the chances of unknown
moderator influences are greater and replicability is achieved
(internal, conceptual replications), then the same should be
true when chances are smaller (independent, direct replica-
tions). Second, the unknown moderator account is usually
invoked for social psychological effects (e.g. Cesario, 2014;
Stroebe & Strack, 2014). However, the lack of influence of
internal replications on independent replication success is not
limited to social psychology. Even for cognitive psychology a
similar pattern appears to hold.
Could psychological findings be more replicable? The re-
sults are encouraging. Low reproducibility is not a feature of
psychological science that derives exclusively from the alleg-
edly variable, context-dependent nature of psychological phe-
nomena. If differences in research strategy and investigated
effects can be minimized, better reproducibility is possible.
Firstly, the Open Science Collaboration has shown how to
minimize the chances of investigating slightly different effects
in original and replication studies. They consulted with orig-
inal authors and used original materials (Open Science
Collaboration, 2015).
Secondly, reproducibility can be boosted by avoiding
QRPs. For example, optional stopping is not a QRP if statis-
tical tests are appropriately adjusted (Lakens, 2014; Sanborn
& Hills, 2013; Wagenmakers, 2007), publication bias can be
avoided by promoting dedicated publication outlets open to
unclear/null findings (e.g. PLoS ONE, prep-print servers,
psychfiledrawer.org), hypothesizing after a result is known is
prevented by basing hypotheses on earlier publications before
sampling begins.
However, the wider challenge lies in removing the
incentives for applying QRPs (for a list of suggestions, see
Asendorpf et al., 2013; Ioannidis, Munafò, Fusar-Poli,
Nosek, & Lakens, 2014; Kerr, 1998). Otherwise, human in-
genuity will likely continue to find ways to present as reliable
what is in truth irreproducible. One promising improvement
lies in altering publication practices, encouraging a two-stage
manuscript submission process that decouples editorial deci-
sions from study results (e.g., pre-registration: Chambers,
2013; Greve, Bröder, & Erdfelder, 2013; Nosek & Lakens,
2014; or withholding results from reviewers: Smulders,
2013; Walster & Cleary, 1970). This report suggests that,
without widespread changes to psychological science, it will
become difficult to distinguish it from informal observations,
anecdotes and guess work.
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